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REPORT ON THE 
 
SUSTAINABILITY AND TRANSFORMATION PLAN 




INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT 
 
This report examines draws attention to some of the concerns arising from the Leicester, 
Leicestershire and Rutland Sustainability and Transformation Plan (STP). The Plan is in draft 
form and this report responds to the draft published on 21
st 
November 2016. It is not a 







Context – Five Year Forward View 
 
NHS England (NHSE) has divided England into 44 areas or ‘footprints’ and has required 
each to produce a Sustainability and Transformation Plan. Leicester, Leicestershire and 
Rutland are Footprint 15. The plans are required to demonstrate how they will bring about 
two principal objectives: one is the implementation of ‘new models of care’; the other is 
achieving financial balance by 2020/21. 
 
The focus on new models of care follows NHS England’s Five Year Forward View (FYFV) 
published in October 2014 and widely understood to reflect strongly the thinking of Simon 
Stevens, Chief Executive of NHSE. FYFV identified three ‘gaps’ to be addressed throughout 
the health system: 
 
 The health and wellbeing gap: focussing on illness prevention 
 The care and quality gap: focussing on restructured provision 





The new models of care indicated in the FYFV are: 
 
 Multispecialty Community Providers (MCPs) – GP practices will be able to come 
together in federations, networks or single organisations. They ‘could in future begin 
employing consultants or take them on as partners, bringing in senior nurses, 
consultant physicians, geriatricians, paediatricians and psychiatrists to work alongside 
community nurses, therapists, pharmacists, psychologists, social workers, and other 
staff’. They will target ‘services at registered patients with complex ongoing needs 
such as the frail elderly or those with chronic conditions, and working much more 
intensively with these patients’. 
 Primary and Acute Care Systems (PACS) – these are forms of ‘vertical integration’ 
allowing ‘single organisations to provide NHS list-based GP and hospital services, 
together with mental health and community care services’. This can include a mature 
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form of the MCP running its local district general hospital. ‘At their most radical, 
PACS would take accountability for the whole health needs of a registered list of 
patients, under a delegated capitated budget - similar to the Accountable Care 
Organisations that are emerging in Spain, the United States, Singapore, and a number 
of other countries.’ 
 Urgent and emergency care networks – Reduced reliance on A&E through greater 
use of primary care, community mental health teams, ambulance services and 
community pharmacies, as well as the 379 urgent care centres throughout the country. 
 Small district general hospitals – This allows for hospitals to be grouped into 
‘chains’ under single management or to have some of their work (e.g. ‘back office 
functions’) managed by another organisation. Some services will no longer be 
provided by some DGHs though their site may be used by another, specialist provider 
 Specialist services – This allows for greater concentration of specialist services onto 
fewer, larger sites. 
 Maternity services – This allows for a reconfiguration of maternity services, for 
groups of midwives to set up midwife-led units and for greater sustainability of 
maternity services. 
 Enhanced health in care homes – This allows for the provision of more services 






Context – Funding 
 
The STPs are a response to the funding settlement for the NHS under the Coalition and 
Conservative governments. Government policy is to shrink the NHS into a smaller share of 
national income and STPs are seen as the mechanism for achieving this. To sustain services 
as they have been provided, the NHS needs a funding increase of around 4% a year after 
inflation and this was the historical average for NHS funding increases between 1950 and 
2010. Between 2010 and 2020, the NHS is receiving on average 1% annual increases after 
inflation. Sustained underfunding (relative to cost pressures) of this scale is historically 
unprecedented. Although efficiencies have been made, NHS finances have worsened and by 
March 2016 there was an underlying provider deficit of £3.7bn. STPs require each footprint 
to restore financial balance by 2020/21. The STP for LLR states that a £399.3m annual ‘gap’ 
between available funding and costs will open up by 2021 if its proposals for restructuring 
are not implemented. 
 
There is strong political pressure to restore balance and as very limited funds are available for 
‘transformation’, the financial driver behind STPs has come to be seen by many, including 
NHS Trust chairs and chief executives, as the principal driver.  As the recent King’s Fund 
report
1 
notes the financial situation of the NHS and the operational pressures upon the service 
are now substantially more challenging than they were in 2014 when the Five Year Forward 
View was published. (See Appendix I for more detail.) 
 
Billions of pounds have been stripped out of the social care budget nationally with real terms 
cuts in local authority budgets since 2010/11, placing local authority funded social care, and 




C Ham et al (2017) Delivering Sustainability and Transformation Plans. King’s Fund 
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Context – Joint planning and Better Care Together 
 
The restructuring of the NHS along competitive market lines, from the 1990s onwards and 
most recently through the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, has led to a complex, 
administratively expensive and highly fragmented system. The STPs require local 
organisations within the health system to work together and this is broadly beneficial. 
 
The STP builds on the reconfiguration work of ‘Better Care Together’, which also had a 
strong ‘financial gap’ rationale, although there are some notable differences. The STP is a 
reiteration of BCT plans but with a more selective focus and an even greater emphasis on 
eliminating the funding gap which has arisen in recent years under the post 2010 national 





STP KEY PROPOSALS 
 
 Increase self-care and encourage healthy living. 
 
 Increase use of pharmacist advice (to reduce need for GP care). 
 




 Home first – where possible look after patients in such a way they can remain at 
home/go back home rather than being in hospital. This involves ‘integrated teams’ or 
multi-disciplinary care in community settings, including the patient’s own home, 
overseen by GP practice. Where possible undertake procedures outside acute hospitals 
and in community settings. 
 
 Care, including ‘intensive community support’, will be provided to more patients in 
their own homes to reduce the need for hospital admission and so that their discharge 




 GPs will focus on patient with complex needs. Where possible, patients needing 
primary care will see health care workers other than GPs. 
 
 GPs will increasingly work in networks. Some services currently provided through 
general practice will be provided ‘at scale’ so that while some services will remain at 





 Closure of all acute beds at Leicester General Hospital (LGH). Reconfigure services 




 Close St Mary’s birthing centre at Melton Mowbray and consultant led maternity 
services at LGH. Concentrate all inpatient maternity services (consultant led and 
 
2 
UHL have more recently said fewer beds will be closed than the figure given in the STP but have not said how 
many beds will be lost. 
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midwife led) at LRI or establish a midwife-led service at LGH (subject to 
consultation). 
 
 Close Fielding Palmer Community Hospital in Lutterworth and Rutland Memorial 
Community Hospital in Oakham. Provide some outpatient services on these sites (in 
any remaining estate). 
 
 Almost halve the bed provision at Hinckley and Bosworth Community Hospital. 
 
 Achieve a net reduction of 38 beds across remaining community hospitals. 
 




 Provide more care through ambulatory emergency care at UHL; provide greater care 
in community settings to prevent emergency admissions; increase referrals to 
alternatives to A&E. 
 
 Further reductions in delayed transfers of care (DTOC). 
 
 Reduce out of area placements for patient with mental illness; increase peer support 




 Further efficiencies within provider organisations and within CCGs. 
 
 Save £412m (annually); requires £350m of capital expenditure. 
 







AREAS OF CONCERN 
 
Poor public patient involvement and absence of key information 
 
The STP for LLR has been developed by a small group of individuals, largely unknown to 
the public, and was reportedly published only after it was leaked to the BBC. There has been 
an almost complete exclusion of the public from the process despite the fact that the services 
at stake are used by the public and paid for by the public. The use of a public and patient 
involvement group in the development of Better Care Together, whose members were 
expressly forbidden from discussing evolving proposals with other members of the public, 
does not offer a strong case study in good PPI practice. 
 
The STP –which, we are told, is still in draft form - is written using a mix of technical 
language, jargon and acronyms. Even the briefer ‘public-facing’ document assumes that 
much terminology will be understood by the public and fails to make some of the key issues 
and consequences explicit. The dubious statutory basis for the STP and the role of the STP 
lead has resulted in hastily put together governance arrangements which are also not 
understood by the public. 
 
Although the draft STP was published in November 2016, STP leads have refused to place 
into the public domain the appendices (or ‘templates’) on finance and workforce. As a result, 
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it is impossible to gauge what the calculations are regarding the financial underpinnings of 
the plan. It is likely that these documents have been withheld from the public because they 
are either unconvincing or politically controversial or both. That the finances are still ‘fluid’, 
to quote an STP lead, does not inspire confidence. The shrinkage of the workforce and the 
shift to more generic workers and (unregistered) associate physicians and nurses at a time of 
growing need are also causes for concern and the refusal to share the assumptions embedded 
in the workforce appendix prohibits the effective scrutiny of the Plan. No comprehensive 





timetable has been imposed on STP leads, leading to rapidly made 
decisions. Drawn up in conditions of secrecy and removed from wider scrutiny, STP 
proposals are now being presented to local authorities across England which are being asked 
to sign up to complex proposals on the basis of limited information and discussion. Effective 
and confident scrutiny of the STP is not possible without greater detail, including the needs 
analysis, and financial and workforce details which are being withheld from the public. 
 
A number of engagement events have taken place across Leicester, Leicestershire and 
Rutland with varying degrees of uptake by the public. The February event in Leicester City 
was well structured and reflected much work by STP leads but failed as an exercise in public 





Finances: Savings Targets are at the centre of the STP proposals 
 
The STP claims that LLR are facing a shortfall of just under £400m annually by 2020/21 
(taking both NHS and social care funding into account) if action is not taken. The detailed 
calculations and assumptions underpinning this figure are not set out in the STP and so are 
not available for scrutiny and independent analysis. So while broadly consistent with 
previous estimates, it is difficult to know, therefore, how sound the £400m figure is. 
 
The STP identifies a number of routes by which, it is claimed, savings can be made to the 
tune of £413m. However, no evidence is provided to convince the reader that these figures 
are more than wishful thinking. For example, on p63, the STP claims that £174m can be 
saved through provider operational efficiencies. As providers have had to make demanding 
and historically unprecedented operational efficiencies since the early Coalition government 
period and since they have developed substantial deficits following wholly unrealistic 
efficiency savings targets
4
, it must be asked whether it is realistic to expect provider 
operational efficiencies on this scale to be delivered. This is just one instance of optimism 
bias, a problem which runs through the STP. 
 
Overall, the STP’s claims that the large-scale savings identified can be made are 
unconvincing but the consequences of failing to generate them are not explored and no Plan 
B is offered. 
 
It is obvious that if services are to be transformed so that more care is given in community 




Former NHS director, reported in GPOnline 
4 
Public Accounts Committee (2016) Sustainability and Financial Performance of Acute Hospital Trusts 
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investment has not so far been pledged by the government. The STP states that around £350m 
worth of capital investment is required. However, the Department of Health has cut its capital 
budget and at present it looks as if at least some of required capital funding will not be 
forthcoming. 
 
Even on its own terms, the capital plan looks problematic as ‘increased demand’ above that 
already assumed is stated as a key risk. It is quite possible that £280m is invested in 
reconfiguring acute hospital services – services which the STP admits are already under 
intense strain - only to discover in a few years’ time or even sooner that this has resulted in 
service provision which is entirely inadequate to address patient need.  This would represent 
a substantial waste of public money as well as significantly reducing the quality of and 
accessibility to health care.  It should be noted that, when looking beyond the local Plan at 
experience elsewhere in England, reconfiguration proposals have consistently failed to 
demonstrate businesses cases offering a convincing case. 
 
In addition to this, the net annual saving resulting from this £280m of capital expenditure 
reconfiguration is just £19.2m. It will take the better part of 15 years of such savings before 
the accumulated savings match the initial cost. While there may be benefits in the new co- 
location of services, this looks an extraordinary sum to pay to achieve relatively modest 
savings, particularly when the danger of capacity reduction is taken into consideration. As the 
STP itself admits to the risk that it may have underestimated future need, these ‘savings’ may 
incur the non-financial costs of bed and capacity shortages compromising patient safety and 
timely access to necessary care or may trigger additional future expenditure to restore 
capacity. This points to the problematic character of a five year plan of this sort when a much 
longer time-frame is required for rational planning. Indeed, the pay back periods for some of 
the different capital projects do extend beyond the five year period. 
 
Given the unpromising prospects of capital funding from public sources, UHL is considering 
a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme. The Treasury Select Committee concluded in 2011 
that the Private Finance Initiative does not provide good value for money
5 
and the modified 
version of PFI (known as PF2) is thought to be even more expensive than PFI
6
. Nationally, 
£2bn of the NHS budget flows out of the NHS into PFI debt repayments each year. It is 
difficult to see how adding to this through a substantial PFI project in LLR will be beneficial 
for LLR health finances in the coming years. The STP claims the capital cost of reconfiguring 
acute services is around £280m. It is likely that if any of this capital is secured through the 
Private Finance Initiative, the initial capital expenditure (and thus long-term capital costs) 
will be higher than it would have been had it been funded publicly. 
 
It should be noted that no reference is made in the STP to the costs which have so far been 
incurred in the development of the Better Care Together proposals since 2012, including the 
management consultancy costs, or to the costs incurred in preparing the STP or projected for 
the public engagement and consultation processes. 
 
The STP provides effectively only a Do Nothing or Do Something choice. Treasury guidance 
on investment appraisal stipulates a Do Minimum option and it is unclear why this has not 





House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2011) Private Finance Initiative 
6 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2014) Private Finance 2; M Hellowell (2014) The Return of 
PFI: Will the NHS Pay a Higher Price for New Hospitals. Centre for Health and the Public Interest 
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Weak evidence base for the overall model of moving services out of hospitals and into 
community settings as a means of enabling hospital bed closures 
 
The STP does not appear to take into account a growing body of evidence challenging its 
core assumptions. 
 
There are a number of good reasons to make more care available in community settings, 
including the patient’s own home, where appropriate. Historically, the NHS has under- 
invested in community based services. High patient satisfaction can be found where 
community services are of a high quality. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
overall system will be cheaper or can reduce acute bed provision. Nor, with the STP as it 
currently stands, can we be certain community services will be of a high quality. 
 
The STP is premised upon a belief that expanding community based services will permit the 
net closure of acute hospital beds. This is almost certainly a false premise and ignores a 
growing body of evidence. A study
7 
examining the findings of reviews which covered 18,000 
different studies found that some community interventions do give rise to a reduction in 
unplanned hospital admissions. However, most types of community intervention either do not 
reduce hospital admissions or there is no convincing evidence to suggest that they do. 
 
Research evidence on the hospital-at-home type initiative seen in intensive community 




found that after 
investigating 38 different integration schemes across 8 different countries including 13 
projects in England, not one had resulted in a sustained, long term reduction in hospital 
admissions. The model of integrated (multidisciplinary) teams described in the STP is 




“In the absence of well-accepted, evidence-based solutions to reducing emergency 
admissions, there is a need to subject promising new interventions and models of 
service provision…to thorough evaluation.” 
 
The local experience reinforces the view that there is a fundamental flaw in the STP’s 
assumption and suggests net closure is not feasible and should not be sought if patient safety 
is to remain paramount. The Strategic Outline Case (SOC) for Better Care Together
11
, 
published in late 2014, pledged a net closure of 427 acute beds out of 1773 acute beds over 
the following five year period. This included 203 beds between April 2015 and March 2015 
and 61 beds between April 2016 and end Sep 2016 (half the figure given in the SOC for April 
2016 to March 2017 on p72). This would have left UHL with 1,509 beds by the end of 
September 2016. 
 
However the STP (published in November 2016) says UHL has 1940 acute beds. This is a net 
increase of 167 beds, fully 431 more beds than had been planned in the BCT Strategic 
 
7 
S Purdy et al (2012) Interventions to Reduce Unplanned Hospital Admissions. University of Bristol 
8 
For example, T Georghiou and A Steventon (2014) Effects of the British Red Cross ‘Support at Home’ service 
on Hospital Utilisation. Nuffield Trust 
9 
Serco/HSJ (2014) A Commission on Hospital Care of Frail Older People. 
10 
T Georghiou and A Steventon (2014) Effects of the British Red Cross ‘Support at Home’ service on Hospital 
Utilisation. Nuffield Trust 
11 
Better Care Together (2014) Strategic Outline Case 
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Outline Case despite an expansion of community based services over this period. 
Confusingly, the figures in the national beds database do not correspond to the figures in 
these local documents, raising questions about the reliability of data used by the NHS. 
However, when figures from the national beds database
12 
are used, there were 49 more beds 
in September 2016 than in September 2014 (most of the addition being in day beds).  This 
again points to the infeasibility of net reductions in beds where patient need is rising even 
where community services are expanding. The ‘reality on the ground’ means beds cannot 





The importance of retaining enough acute hospital beds for safe patient care 
 
As well as relatively low levels of investment in community services, the UK does not fare 
well in terms of hospital bed provision when compared with developed countries 
internationally. The most recent OECD figures
13 
for hospital bed provision (2014) indicate an 
average of around 4.8 beds per 1,000 population among developed countries. The figure is 
2.7 for the UK and around 2.5 for England – in other words, little more than half the average. 
We are amongst the lowest in bed provision in the whole of the developed world. It is 
unconvincing to argue that cutting hospital beds will improve patient care and points to the 



















In 2014 the Nuffield Trust published
14 
national bed projections for 2022 and found that an 
extra 17,000 beds would be needed on the basis of existing trends by 2022 across England in 
order to cater for an extra 6.2 million bed days. The Nuffield allowed that speedier discharge 
and more day case treatment could mitigate this figure. However, many of these efficiencies 
have already been achieved and the steady fall in the number of general and acute hospital 
beds nationally (from 126,976 in 2006 to 101,582 in 2016) cannot be expected to continue 
indefinitely. Even allowing for some further efficiencies, it is unconvincing to suggest the 
 
12 
NHS England (2017) Bed Availability and Occupancy. NHS England Statistical Work Areas 
13 
OECD (2017) Hospital Beds indicator OECD 
14 
P Smith et al (2014) NHS hospitals under pressure: trends in acute activity up to 2022. Nuffield Trust 





Nuffield’s projected net increase in required beds of about 13% can be turned locally into a 
net reduction in beds of almost 13%. 
 
Bed occupancy figures also point to the clinical risks of bed closure. Where national bed 
occupancy figures are based on midnight measures, they do not reflect the day to day reality 
of bed use. Locally, bed occupancy is very high, often 95%-100% during the winter period 




by the Nuffield Trust has underlined the clinical risks of these dangerously 
high levels of occupancy. These include the greater difficulty in finding beds for emergency 
patients, increased ‘trolley-waits’, further compromises to the 4 hour wait standard in A&E, 
disruption to sick patients, additional workload and stress for staff, difficulties in maintaining 
cleanliness and the greater likelihood of infection spread. Several studies have established a 
link between high bed occupancy and increased rates of infection. 
 
Despite these dangers and despite the relatively mild nature of the winter, between Nov 2015 
and Feb 2016, bed occupancy rates in England fluctuated consistently around the 95% 
occupancy level. The recent intense pressure on beds nationally was widely covered in the 
media and UHL was among those hospitals having to issue the most Operational Pressures 
Escalation Levels alerts. Sir Mike Richards, chief inspector of hospitals at the Care Quality 
Commission, also recently warned
16 
of the compromises to patient safety in a context of 
financially straitened circumstances relative to rising need where hospitals were confronted 
with problems often beyond their control. 
 
According to the STP, a net reduction of 38 community hospital beds is proposed. It is 
difficult to see how reducing community hospital capacity simultaneously can do anything 
other than impede plans to close acute beds and it is noted that earlier Better Care Together 
plans did not entail the net reduction in community hospital beds which we find in the STP. 
 
Reconfiguration of mental health services and bed reductions in recent years has resulted 
precisely in inadequate capacity and poor quality services across many parts of the UK. The 
reconfiguration of mental health services represented a move away from evidence-based 
approaches to approaches with a relatively weak evidence base
17
. It is important that these 
mistakes are not made again in relation to physical health. A high quality and accessible 
hospital with sufficient capacity is an essential part of safe community based care. 
 
Finally, it should be remembered that social care provision in the communities into which 
services are being transferred is already under tremendous strain. The National Audit Office
18 
notes that local authority spending on adult social care has reduced by 10% since 2009/10. 
During this time demographic pressures have pushed up the cost of providing care for older 
and disabled people. Age UK
19 
reported in 2016 that around 1.2 million people do not receive 








J Appleby (2016) Winter bed pressures. Nuffield Trust Winter Insight Briefing 1 
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H Gilburt (2015) Mental health under pressure. King’s Fund 
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NAO (2017) Health and Social Care Integration. National Audit Office 
19 
Age UK (2016) 1.2m older people don’t get the social care they need. Age UK News 17
th 
November 








Weak evidence base for the assumption that the model of moving services out of 
hospitals and into community settings will create a cheaper (per unit) health system 
 
There is no robust body of evidence that expanding community services and enhancing 
service integration will result in cash savings or cheaper care. The Commission on Hospital 
Care for Older People
20 
described as a ‘myth’ the notion that providing more care for older 
people in the community and pooling health and social care budgets will lead to cashable 




“There is no compelling evidence to show that integration in England leads to 
sustainable financial savings or reduced hospital activity”. 
 
Limited research has been conducted on this and different studies have been difficult to 
compare. An analysis
22 
of economic impacts of integrated care found 19 reviews of which 18 
reported on cost-effectiveness. It found there is evidence of cost–effectiveness in selected 
integrated care approaches but the evidence is mixed with some studies suggesting higher 
costs. Overall the evidence base remains weak. The same study reported: 
 
“Utilization and cost were the most common economic outcomes assessed by 
reviews but reporting of measures was inconsistent and the quality of the evidence 
was often low. The majority of economic outcomes focused on hospital utilization 
through (re)admission rates, length of stay or admission days and emergency 
department visits. Findings tended to be mixed within each review, which makes it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions. Also, results were commonly not quantified, 
making an overall assessment of the size of possible effects problematic. Seventeen 
reviews reported cost and/or expenditure data in some form, typically reporting cost 
in terms of health-care cost savings resulting from the intervention, most frequently 
in relation to hospital costs. There was some evidence of cost reduction in a number 
of reviews; however, findings were frequently based on a small number of original 
studies only, or studies that only used a before–after design without control, or both.” 
 




“…in the context of long-term trends of rising demand, our analysis suggests that the 
falls in hospital activity projected in many STPs will be extremely difficult to realise. 
A significant shift in care will require additional supporting facilities in the 
community, appropriate workforce and strong analytical capacity. These are 
frequently lacking and rely heavily on additional investment, which is not available. 
 
“…NHS bodies frequently overstate the economic benefits of initiatives intended to 
shift the balance of care. For example, they may use prices to calculate savings rather 






Serco/HSJ (2014) A Commission on Hospital Care of Frail Older People. HSJ 
21 
NAO (2017) Health and Social Care Integration. National Audit Office 
22 
E Nolte and E Pitchforth (2014) Evidence of economic impacts of integrated care. WHO 
23 
C Imison et al (2017) Shifting the Balance of Care: Great Expectations. Nuffield Trust 





be fully taken out. Similarly, many underestimate the potential that community-based 




The Nuffield Trust report concluded: 
 
“While out-of-hospital care may be better for patients, it is not likely to be cheaper 
for the NHS in the short to medium term – and certainly not within the tight 
timescales under which the STPs are expected to deliver change.” 
 
Reduction in unit cost may be driven by re-provision which is deliberately cheaper (e.g. less 
care given or care given by less qualified and experienced staff) as seen in social care. It is 
difficult to see how improved patient care is compatible with this. 
 
Well-planned and coordinated delivery of services by cooperation across teams and agencies, 
hospitals and community is essential for those with complex and long-term needs. Substantial 
investment in developing services is required so that alternative provision can be tested 





Centralisation of services and removal of services from Rutland 
 
The STP proposes a significant centralisation of services. The closure of Rutland Memorial 
Community Hospital in Oakham and the removal of acute beds from Leicester General 
Hospital leave a forty mile gap with no beds between Leicester and Peterborough. The 
Fielding Palmer Community Hospital in Lutterworth is also proposed for closure and beds at 
the relatively new Hinckley and Bosworth Community Hospital are to be all but halved. 
 
Maternity services are also to be centralised on the site of the Leicester Royal Infirmary since 
provision is to be removed from Melton Mowbray with the proposed closure of St Mary’s 
and consultant-led care is to be withdrawn from the Leicester General Hospital where 
currently around 4,400 births take place each year. Current plans are to consult on the 
possibility of a midwife led unit at the Leicester General Hospital. 
 
There is no specificity regarding the services to be offered to Rutland patients at Oakham 
once the hospital is closed and there is no ‘Plan’ specifically for Rutland which is expected to 
give up many of its health services without knowing in detail how primary and community 
based care is to be strengthened. 
 
The STP does not appear to take into account the availability of residential and nursing home 
care, a sector already struggling with financial and workforce difficulties, or the difficulties 







The NHS is facing a substantial challenge with problems in both recruitment and retention of 
staff across the range of professions. Alongside this, insufficient numbers are being trained. 
Workforce planning has been poor for many years. 





The East Midlands has proportionately fewer doctors, administrative and ancillary staff when 
compared with England as a whole. Across all professional categories, it has fewer 
professionals per head of population than the national average. As the East Midlands trains 
more than its share of some categories of professionals (adult nurses, occupational therapists 
and physiotherapists), there is clearly a problem of retention. 
 
Staff, rather than receiving support through an expanded workforce and avoidance of 
disruptive change, are caught in a maelstrom of unrelenting reorganisation, staff shortages, 
rising need and chronic underfunding. Staff are being forced to undertake higher band duties 
on lower band pay and to undertake additional duties when there are staffing gaps. These 
problems are exacerbated by ‘cost improvement programmes’ undertaken by providers and 
which are highly disruptive of staff morale. 
 
The STP admits that the development of Integrated Locality teams will require significant 
change in how the workforce is organised and led. On top of existing pressures, staff face the 
prospect of new contractual and structural arrangements. In the context of a properly funded 
service where a shift towards a proven model of care is well resourced and staff properly 
supported, these sorts of changes are easier to bear. However, the new integrated model of 
care is unproven and may well not work. Imposing change on staff who are already under 
acute pressure runs the risk of alienating and exhausting even more staff and losing them as 
they give up their jobs or retire. In this way, the STP could well make staffing problems 
worse. 
 
To some extent, services are being reorganised around workforce shortages rather than the 
workforce being planned around the health services that patients need. This is putting the cart 
before the horse. The STP justifies the closure of the Leicester General as an acute hospital 
and the closure of two community hospitals on the basis that staff are too thinly spread. 
However, it is difficult to see how moving patients out of hospital wards and into their own 
homes will result in more effective use of the workforce unless they envisage care given at 
home being delivered by cheaper and less qualified and experienced staff. 
 
The STP says that staff lack the skills and confidence to maintain patients in the community. 
However, experienced staff have been leaving the NHS partly as a result of the increasing 
pressure on the service and on themselves. Yet, experienced staff are needed for work in 
community settings because they will be undertaking more lone work and thus must work 
more autonomously. 
 
Workforce data are being withheld from the public but, despite an assertion that the 
workforce is essential for a successful health and social care system, early indications suggest 
the workforce is planned to shrink and to be restructured with overall a lower skill mix, 
meaning that more care will be given by staff who are less qualified and less experienced. 
Physician Associates may have a role but it should be remembered that they have just two 
years of training and may facilitate de-professionalisation and tighter management control 
over professional decision making. There is no mandatory registration for them, raising 
concerns about their regulation. Similarly, nurse associates will not be registered 
professionals. 
 
It is important to consider lessons which can be learnt from social care. Privatisation of social 
care provision as a means to manage inadequate council budgets has resulted in the 





depression of wages and the casualization of carers
24 
so that the turnover of carers in the 
social care sector is very high and private providers complain of recruitment and retention 
difficulties. 
 
With regard to the STP, the proportionate increase in the number of posts needed in the 
coming decade is greater than the increase in the population. The danger is that an increasing 
amount of ‘health’ care is going to be given by untrained and unqualified staff as CCGs turn 
to outsource the provision of services transferred to the community because independent 
bidders offer to provide services at lower cost. It is difficult to see how quality can be 
restored or upheld in this scenario. Poor quality of health care given in people’s own homes 
will be as difficult to detect as poor quality social care currently is. 
 
The lack of adequate numbers of staff to deliver the proposed new models of service could 
prove to be an even more important obstacle than the lack of funding and the lack of capital, 
both of which could potentially be addressed simply with a change in government policy. A 
lack of staff to deliver the new services could prevent the effective implementation of the 








Access to GPs 
 
The STP plans to alter the GP model of care in place since 1948. The STP offers the prospect 
of longer GP appointments for some patients, should sufficient numbers of GPs be in place. 
However, this will not apply to all patients. The STP summary document speaks of 
‘strengthening GP surgeries’, a wise redrafting of the original version which referred instead 
to ‘strengthening GP services’ since it is likely to become more difficult for patients to see 
their GPs unless they have multiple illnesses or complex conditions. Instead, patients can 
more frequently expect to see a health care worker other than the GP. The implications for 
quality of care will depend largely on the quality of the triage process and the suitability of 
the substitute worker for the health care need the patient has identified. This is not made clear 
in the STP or public summary of the STP. 
 
For some time, research has suggested that continuity of care leads to better outcomes for 
patients
25
; more recently, a Health Foundation
26 
Briefing paper suggested hospital admissions 
could be reduced by greater continuity of care. However, it is possible that the plans to 
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Weak risk analysis and the experimental nature of the new models of care 
 
As the analysis above suggests, the new models of care incorporated in the STP proposals are 
of a somewhat experimental nature and this was admitted at the public engagement event 
hosted by Leicester City CCG in February 2017. The STP represents a shift away from a tried 
and tested a model of care which, while not perfect and while always subject to national 
funding policy, was able to offer good levels of access to high quality care provided by 
highly skilled registered professionals. Instead, the proposals push us towards unproven 
models of care. Although ‘vanguard’ projects are piloting a range of models across England, 
these have not been properly evaluated and, since they are relatively new initiatives, effective 
evaluation may not be possible for some time. 
In relation to integrated models of care, the National Audit Office
27 
recently concluded: 
“The Departments [of Health and for Communities and Local Government] have not 
yet established a robust evidence base to show that integration leads to better 
outcomes for patients. The Departments have not tested integration at scale and are 
unable to show whether any success is both sustainable and attributable to integration. 
International examples of successful integration provide valuable learning but their 
success takes place in a context of different statutory, cultural and organisational 
environments”. 
 
The NAO report added 
 
“.. the new care models are as yet unproven and their impact is still being evaluated. 
NHS England plans to have evaluated the effectiveness and value for money of the 
new care models programme by the end of 2018. Despite this, the NHS mandate 
requires NHS England to roll out the new care models rapidly; achieving 20% 
coverage by the end of 2016-17 and 50% by 2020”. 
 
In relation to the unproven and experimental nature of the new models of care and the 
potential deterioration in the quality and volume of services provided, the risk analysis in the 
STP is weak. In addition to this must be added the paucity of funding available for ‘double 
running’, that is to say, available to run both new services in the community and existing 
services in hospitals for the substantial period necessary to be certain the new services 
adequately replace existing services. 
 
The risks posed are exacerbated by the absence of a detailed needs analysis from the 







A five year period is a poor basis for NHS planning and the short-termism of the STP 
jeopardises rational service planning for the longer term. 
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The STP weakens its own case by omitting a large body of relevant detailed information. The 
assumptions on which the financial effects of the proposals are calculated are not transparent, 
making effective scrutiny impossible. 
 
The STP establishes a number of aims but does not demonstrate how these will be achieved 
by the proposals suggested. 
 
As the STP provides no detailed needs analysis, it is difficult to establish that, as it stands, it 
is fit for purpose. 
 
While some of the aspirations which inform the STP are worthy, there is little to convince us 
that the proposals can safeguard quality care through the new models of care or can deliver 
the scale of financial savings claimed. The risk analysis provided is weak. 
 
Community initiatives which work are to be welcomed but assessing their impact takes time 
and a buffer is needed during this period through ‘double running’ services. 
 
Although the Plan includes some positive ideas, including expanding services in community 
settings and facilitating more self-care, the key challenge is to assess whether it is likely that 
patient and client care as a whole will be improved – or even maintained - while stripping out 
£400m every year from the system. This looks highly improbable. 
 
The UK is one of the lowest bedded health systems in the developed world and the current 
proposals to reduce hospital capacity lack all credibility. 
 
The new models of care are cost-driven where change in practice should be driven by a 
combination of clinical need, clinical quality and reasonable patient access. Service changes 
should be rigorously assessed against these criteria. The new models of care have not been 
sufficiently evaluated and are not supported by a strong body of high quality research 
evidence. 
 
The Plan seeks to address problems of recruitment and retention but may, through further 
reorganisation and restructuring, exacerbate these problems, particularly where staff believe 
the quality of services is poor. 
 
For a range of reasons, it is unlikely that the scale of financial savings promised by the STP 
will materialise. If the financial case were so clear we would expect the relevant information 
to be made available. 
 
STP leads should produce a Do Minimum option which could remove a substantial layer of 
cost associated with the STP. 
 
It is important that high quality replacement services are established and sufficiently tested 
for their impact in terms of both quality and quantity before existing services are closed. The 
development and expansion of high quality services in the community requires substantial 
additional investment. It is not clear at the time of writing whether announcements made in 
the March 2017 budget will be sufficient to address this challenge. 
 
Investment decisions should be based on securing improvement in the quality of services and 
not on attempting to cut health care costs. A five year framework is inadequate for guiding 
investments with long term implications for services. 





It is not clear from the STP whether the investments it proposes are economic (whether they 
could be achieved more cheaply by other means); realistic (whether the business case and 
underpinning evidence base for the proposals are sound); or deliverable (whether the 
assumptions about the capital available and staffing (for example) are sound given the scale 
of the plans put forward for savings and provision. 
 
While there may be a good case for investment in service redesign to improve services, on 
the available evidence capital expenditure of £280m to move from three acute sites to two 
cannot be considered a worthwhile expenditure to achieve savings, particularly when likely 
deficiencies in the resulting services are taken into consideration. 
 
The Plan will result in less accessible and poorer quality care and will achieve neither 
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Appendix I NHS Finances 
 
The NHS requires around 4% a year real terms increase in funding to keep pace with cost 
pressures arising from 
 
 Change population size and structure 
 Changing profile of morbidity 
 Health service specific inflation (higher than general inflation) 
 Medical technology and innovation. 
 
A real terms annual rise of around 4% a year was the historic average between 1950 and 
2010, though Labour governments tended to fund more generously than Conservative 
governments. 
 
Rather than 4% a year, the Coalition and Conservative governments have created a funding 
settlement for the NHS which gives on average just 1% a year between 2010 and 2020. At the 
same time, social care funding has been dramatically cut. Now that the majority of sizeable 
efficiencies have been made, radical restructuring to cut the unit cost of health care is being 
proposed. 
 
Around £120bn is currently being spent on the Department of Health and NHS in England. 
Although around the middle of the ranking of OECD nations, the UK lags behind comparable 
rich nations in its funding of health care. The most recent OECD statistics
28 
show the 
following (based on new definitions of expenditure which include social care expenditure) 
 
Table 2: % GDP spent on health and social care (using the new OECD definition) and 
per person purchasing parity in US dollars for selected countries, 2015 
 
 
 % GDP 2015 US$ per person 
purchasing parity 
(current prices) 2015 
Austria 10.4 5,016 
France 11.0 4,407 
Germany 11.1 5,267 
The Netherlands 10.8 5,343 
Norway 9.9 6,567 
Sweden 11.1 5,228 
Switzerland 11.5 6,935 




The proportion of the GDP spent on health care is falling year on year and is set to fall further 
before 2020. An analysis
29 
of funding in Europe since 1980 found that the UK had spent 
around 20% less on health care than the European average over the period. An additional 
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